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ANNUAL SURVEY OF TENNESSEE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL H. SANDERS*

Administrative Law consists of those legal principles, whether of
constitutional, statutory or common law derivation, which are generally concerned with the organization, relationships, powers and
procedures of administrative agencies.' These are the agencies of
government, other than the regular courts and legislatures, which can
determine private rights through adjudication or affect these rights
through the making of rules having the status of law. It will be noted
that the definition excludes the substantive rules of law applied and
developed through such agencies. 2 Procedural in nature, it is an area
of law in which the institution of judicial review of administrative

action continues to be of central, though diminished, importance.3
Through extensive studies4 and the passage of the Federal Adminis-

trative Procedure Act,5 the systematizing of this area of law at the
federal level has been greatly advanced in recent years. Few states
have made similar strides, although administrative agencies at the
state and local level may be even more numerous." Tennessee has not
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.

1. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1-4 (1951).

2. The activities of these agencies cut across almost all fields of substantive
regarded as the
most important single factor in the development of a particular area of law
law and in many instances the work of the agency may be

within the state. This is true, for example, of the work of the Railroad and
Public Utilities Commission in the field of substantive Transportation Law

and Public Utility Law. In an Appendix to this article there is included a
summary of some of the more important decisions of this agency during the
survey year.

In another area, see Note, Claims against the State of Tennessee-The
Board of Claims, 4 V D.L. REV. 875-904 (1951).

3. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (1951).
4. See REPORT wrr SPECIAL STUDIES OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT (1937); Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., SEN. Doc.
No. 10, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941).
5. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § § 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1950).

6. For an indication of the number in Tennessee, see Boone, An Examina-

tion of the Tennessee Law of Administrative Procedure, 1 VAND. L. REV. 339,
340-41 (1948).
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attempted any comprehensive statutory regulation such as the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act.7 What might have been a legislative attempt at detailed coverage of the topic of judicial review, in

conjunction with the adoption of the 1932 Code, has been treated as
accomplishing little change in the pre-existing law.

In its decision of

major importance in this field of law during the current survey year,
the Tennessee Supreme Court invoked the Constitution to prevent
from becoming effective what could have been a far-reaching statutory
change in the scope of judicial review.9 Apart from this decision there
was little development of more than routine significance during the
period.
Statutory Basis of Power
Two decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court serve to stress the
basic importance of the particular statutory framework in determining
the powers of an administrative agency. General regulatory statutes
or the constitution may impose additional restraints; but an administrative agency cannot exercise authority in the first place except such
as is provided within the four walls of the legislation creating itand
setting forth its functions.'0 This is a matter of administrative conformity to the standards provided by the law-making authority. A
basis of common or generalized law being lacking, determining the
existence of power of an administrative agency to take certain action
or to follow a certain procedure becomes first of all then an exercise
in statutory construction."
In Young v. Warren County Beer Board,12 a permit to sell beer
outside the corporate limits of McMinnville was revoked by the Beer
Board on the basis of misrepresentation in the application. On a petition attached to the application only three of the nine signatures of
alleged property owners in the vicinity were such in fact. The circuit
court, after petition for certiorari was filed with it, affirmed the board's
action. On appeal the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Neil, reversed. In granting or revoking permits the beer board
has no authority to prescribe restrictions beyond those set forth in the
statute. The action of the board in requesting the applicant to secure
the approval of property owners in the vicinity, "while commendable,"
7. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws (1944) 329; id. (1946) 191, 202.

8. Anderson v. Memphis, 167 Tenn. 642, 72 S.W.2d 1059 (1934).
9. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad and Public Utilities Comm'n, 195
Tenn.593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
10. Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 66 Sup. Ct. 637, 90 L. Ed.
718 (1946).
11. This is not meant to suggest that the administrative agency does not play
an important role in the development of the meaning of the statute under
which it operates. See Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470-92 (1950).
12. 195 Tenn. 211, 258 S.W.2d 763 (1953).
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was not required by law and the paper with signatures was not a part
of the application. The issue of fraud was related to a collateral
matter. Thus the statutory power of the board to revoke for false
statements in the application could not be invoked.' 3
A logical difficulty here may be noted. The beer board apparently
was not acting beyond its authority in asking the applicant to furnish
the signatures of property owners. It undoubtedly had the discretion
to reject an application for a permit fully complying with the requirements of the statute, because of the absence of such signatures. 14
Nevertheless, the case holds, even if fraud exists as to such signatures,
it is of no legal significance if the board seeks to revoke the permit.
The discretion which the statute affords the beer board in the granting
of permits is found by a process of strict interpretation to be drastically
reduced in the matter of revocation.
On the merits, the decision appears to be at odds with language in
earlier Tennessee decisions indicating considerable discretion in beer
boards in the matter of revocation as well as in the granting of permits.15 An additional basis for the revocation here, the board's finding
that granting beer permits outside city limits was detrimental to the
community's peace, health and general welfare, was dismissed as
mere opinion unsupported by testimony and not responsive to any
issue in the case. That the legislature had made specific statutory
provision for the granting of such permits would seem to have been
a complete answer to this asserted reason.' 6
In Range Pontiac Sales Co. v. Dickinson,'7 a case involving the
confiscation of an automobile used in the transportation of unstamped
liquor, the Supreme Court was similarly strict in requiring adherence
to statutory conditions as a basis for the exercise of administrative
authority. Justice Tomlinson's opinion states that the Commissioner
of Finance and Taxation was not empowered to sell an automobile
claimed by a conditional vendor even if it were assumed that the
purchaser had a reputation for liquor law violation and inquiry of
proper officials had not been made. The lack of-authority in the commissioner, the opinion states, stemmed from a failure to follow precisely and within defined time limits the steps set forth in the con13. TENN. CODE AxN. § 1191.14 (Williams 1943, and Supp. 1952).
14. State ex rel. Camper v. Pollard, 189 Tenn. 86, 222 S.W.2d 374 (1949);
State ex rel. Simmons v. Latimer, 186 Tenn. 577, 212 S.W.2d 386 (1948); cf.
Gatlinburg Beer Regulation Committee v. Ogle, 185 Tenn. 482, 206 S.W.2d
891 (1947).
15. Putnam County Beer Bd. v. Speck, 184 Tenn. 623, 201 S.W.2d 991 (1947);
Sowell v. Red, 192 Tenn. 681, 241 S.W.2d 775 (1951); but cf. Perry v. Sevier
County Beer Comm'n, 181 Tenn. 696, 184 S.W.2d 32 (1944).
16. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 1191.14 (Williams 1934); see Perry v. Sevier County
Beer Comm'n, 181 Tenn. 696, 184 S.W.2d 32 (1944).
17. 195 Tenn. 228, 258 S.W.2d 770 (1953).
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fiscation statute.18 The sheriff seizing the car had turned it over to
representatives of the Federal Alcohol Tax Unit. Absolute compliance
with statutory provisions is treated as a condition for the legal accomplishment of confiscation, under the rule of strict construction
applicable to forfeitures. In adhering to its decision on the petition to
rehear the court rejected an argument phrased in terms of equity:
"The Court did not consider equities. Its decision was rested solely
upon the absence of authority in the Commissioner under the facts
of this case."'19
In another confiscation case during the survey period, Dickinson v.
Ross, 20 the court sustained the commissioner's order for the sale of a
confiscated automobile even though there had been an unlawful search
in securing evidence that the car was being used in the transportation
of contraband liquor. Under the statute21 the commissioner was
authorized, in the hearing before him for the return of the car, to
place the initial burden of proving title and lack of guilty knowledge
upon the petitioner. Since in meeting this burden petitioner had
testified to his own law violation instead of claiming his immunity and
since he had not objected to testimony of others with regard to the
results of the unlawful search he was taken to have waived any
objection he might have had on a constitutional ground. While petitioner was not prevented from asserting his constitutional rights in
the hearing before the commissioner it is not clear that he could have
asserted and protected them and, at the same time, succeeded in
securing the return of his automobile.
FairHearing
The confiscation case last discussed throws some light on the widelydiscussed topic of "fair hearing" in administrative proceedings. It
illustrates that drastic departures from conventional procedures, when
authorized by statute, may still meet basic constitutional requirements.
The generalization of Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme
Court is equally applicable in the states: "[Due Process] guarantees
no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights.' 22
Nevertheless the normal attributes of a judicial hearing must be accorded if one's rights are being adjudicated. Statutes will normally
TENN. CODE SUPP. § 6648.24 (1950).
19. 258 S.W.2d 773. See also Wells v. McCanless, 184 Tenn. 293, 198 S.W.2d

18.

641, 643 (1947).
20. 264 S.W.2d 800 (Tenn. 1954).
21. TENN. CODE SuPP. § 6648.25 (1950).
22. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333, 351, 58 Sup.
Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381 (1938).
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be interpreted as requiring such attributes whether expressly set
forth or not because they rest upon a constitutional basis.2
There was only oblique treatment of fair hearing elements in the
Tennessee Administrative Law Cases during the survey period. In
the Young case discussed above, 24 the petition to have Young's beer
permit revoked had asserted lack of notice to surrounding property
owners prior to the granting of the permit. The board had not relied
on this as a reason for its revocation and in the supreme court opinion
it is asserted that this contention with respect to notice is wholly
irrelevant, since the statute imposed no requirement of notice to
surrounding property owners either by the applicant or the beer
board.2 5 Implicit in such a statement is the assumption that no legal
rights of surrounding property owners are being determined when the
beer board passes upon an application for a permit. The relationship
between notice and opportunity to be heard (as phases of procedural
due process) is indicated by the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision
in McCord v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 2 6 where an assessment
by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission was overturned because the carrier had not been given adequate notice of, and opportunity to present evidence under, the theory of assessment adopted
in the case by the commission. This case was again before the court
during the survey period under the style of Browning v. Alabama
Great Southern R. Co. 2 7 The opinion indicates that this phase of the
case had been corrected, the carrier being "fully advised" of the theory
of the assessing authorities and being allowed to introduce testimony
/
to meet this theory.28 Roberts v. Knoxville Transit Lines,28
a indicates
that notice in administrative proceedings is not controlled by the technicalities of pleading.
An impartial tribunal is usually regarded as one of the essentials
of a fair hearing when rights are determined. "Bias" is a term with
many shades of meaning, however, even as applied to normal judicial
activity, and it is clear that many of these can exist in the particular
tribunal without invalidating the proceedings. 29 It can hardly be
contended that a hearing to adjudicate rights is fair when conducted
23. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 478, 56 Sup. Ct. 906, 80 L. Ed.
1288 (1936).
24. Supra p. 734
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1191.14 (Williams 1934). See also State ex rel.
Camper v. Pollard, 189 Tenn. 86, 222 S.W.2d 374 (1949).

26. 187 Tenn. 302, 213 S.W.2d 207 (1948). On the general subject, see Boone,
An Examination of the Tennessee Law of Administrative Procedure,1 VAND.
L. R v. 339, 357-69 (1948).

27. 195 Tenn. 252, 259 S.W.2d 154 (1953).
28. Id. at 155.
28a. 259 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tenn. App. 1952).
29. DAviS, ADMINISTRATivE LAW c. 9 (1951).
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before those whose minds are firmly closed against further inquiry
upon the issues or persons involved in the case or those personally
interested in a direct, tangible way in the outcome.30 Judges and
members of administrative agencies inevitably will possess and develop points of view,, and basic policy judgments concerning matters
coming before them. If this type of "bias" prevents a tribunal from
being impartial in an invalidating sense, it would be impossible for
cases to be determined.31 The Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized that those who decide "may have an underlying philosophy
' 32
in approaching a specific case.
The principle last discussed was applied by the Supreme Court of
8
Tennessee in the case of State ex rel. Caylor v. Miller.
Justice
Gailor's opinion finds no merit in the contention of one whose beer
permit had been revoked that the members of the Beer Commission
of Sevier County were prejudiced. The permit holder had filed a plea
in abatement to its jurisdiction before the commission on the basis
of prejudice. At the commission's hearing on this plea no evidence
was introduced except that it was proved and admitted that the chairman of the commission "disapproved of beer and the sale of beer."
The chairman and all the other members of the commission stated
they would pass on the petition "according to law and the evidence,
and without regard to their own personal appetites and convictions.""
The court examined the full proceedings before the commission and
concluded that they were conducted without prejudice to the permit
holder.
Bias was the turning point of the decision in Roberts v. Knoxville
Transit Linese5 decided by the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section,
although the particulars are not clear from the opinion. The case involved the issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity by
the Knoxville Public Utilities Commission for a closed-door bus service
from downtown Knoxville to an outlying Sears store. Knoxville
Transit Lines opposed the application and secured a reversal of the
commission's action in the circuit court on the basis of lack of sufficient supporting evidence. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by
Judge McAmis, reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court
30. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927); see

DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw 385 (1951).
31. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 370 (1951). This is

to be distinguished from

the so-called "rule of necessity" under which even a biased official may be
the only one legally capable of taking action. State ex tel. Bradshaw v.
Hedrick, 294 Mo. 21, 241 S.W. 402 (1922); but cf. State ex Tel. Miller v. Aldridge, 212 Ala. 660, 103 So. 835 (1925). See Note, 39 A.L.R. 1476 (1925), and
DAVIS, ADMIISTRATIVE LAW 382-83 (1951).
32. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 61 Sup. Ct. 999, 85 L. Ed.
1429 (1941).
33. 263 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1953).
34. Id at 502.
35. 259 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
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for further trial. The court concluded that the evidence before the
commission supported its granting of the certificate and that such
action was not capricious or arbitrary. The remand was made necessary because: "The petition for certiorari as shown charges, however,
that the members of the commission prejudged the application and
we think petitioner is entitled to a trial on that question."3 6 We are
given no further facts nor comment except that the opinion points
out that the burden of proof was upon the petitioner to sustain this
charge.
Judicial Review
The importance of judicial review as an institution in a discussion
of Administrative Law might be assumed to rest upon the fact that
the very existence of law in this area depends upon it. This would
be erroneous since constitutional, statutory and common law controls
over the organization, powers and procedure of administrative agencies
are routinely considered and applied by the agencies themselves. This
is not to say that there would not be profound differences in the
character of the whole field of Administrative Law if the institution
were drastically curtailed. A considerable part of Administrative Law
is concerned with questions as to the mechanics of judicial reviewwhen, by what method, and to what extent will the courts exercise
controlling restraints over the activity of administrative agencies. 7
There were no Tennessee decisions during the survey period dealing
with the timing of judicial review. The litigation involved in Young
v. Warren County Beer Board 8 had come before the supreme court
in 1952, after the entry of an order by the board revoking a beer
permit upon condition of payment of $700 to the permit holder by
those petitioning for the revocation. The Supreme Court held 39 that
the circuit court on certiorari could review such an order, determine
its illegality and correct the illegality of the proceedings by remanding the case to the beer board for.the entry of a final and proper order.
This sensible result was reached without detailed discussion of the
intricacies which 'have surrounded the questions of a "final order"
and ripeness for review in some jurisdictions.
However, some of
the language in the decision indicating a rather complete freedom of
review at an intermediate stage may be misleading.
Tennessee is fortunate in having achieved a comparative simplicity
36. Id. at 890.

37. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw cc. 15-17, 19, 20 (1951); 1 VAID. L. REV.339,

369-74 (1948); and see the comprehensive treatment of one phase of this
topic in Lacey, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Tennessee-Scope
of Review, 23 TENN. L. REV. 349-69 (1954).
38. Supra note 12.
39. Bragg v. Boyd, 246 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1952).

40. See DAVIs,

ADMunsTRATm LAw 620 (1951).
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as to the method of securing judicial review of administrative agencies
-an area of law that is truly chaotic in some states.4 ' Code Sections
9008-901842 set forth what appears to be a comprehensive plan for obtaining judicial review by petition of certiorari in the chancery or
circuit court "where not otherw ise specifically provided." However,
some of the apparent simplicity vanishes when it is noted that these
code sections have been held not to destroy the distinction between
the "common law" or "constitutional" certiorari provided by Code
§ 8989 and the statutory writ in lieu of appeal under Code § 8990.4 3
The common law writ as a method of review would seem to be always
44
available, if desired, perhaps as a matter of constitutional right.
The statute might limit review to this method 45 or achieve the same
-result by according "finality" to certain administrative determinations. 4 6 As will be seen later, only common law certiorari can be used
if the matter reviewed involves the performance of a legislative or
administrative as opposed to a judicial function. 47 Major uncertainty
continues to surround the availability to review administrative agency
action of the statutory writ with its trial de novo.
When the statute prescribes review of beer board action by the
common law writ of certiorari in the circuit court, that method is
exclusive, the Supreme Court held in Crowe v. Carter County.:" The
court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Neil, affirmed the action of the
chancellor in sustaining a demurrer to a bill for an injunction to
restrain the beer board from revoking a permit. The injunction was
sought upon the basis that the action of the quarterly court in creating
the beer board was illegal. Such a fact would be "wholly immaterial"
the court says, "The fact that the rights of the permit holder is [sic]
adversely affected by the action of such regulatory agencies is sufficient to confer jurisdiction solely upon circuit courts [as provided in
Code § 1191.47]."-5
41. See id. at c. 17.

42. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9008-9018 (Williams 1934).

43. Anderson v. Memphis, 167 Tenn. 648, 72 S.W.2d 1059 (1934); Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. Railroad and Public Utilities Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 233
(1953).
44.

TENN.

CONST. Art. VI,

§

10.

45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1191.14 (Williams Supp. 1952); Putnam County Beer
Bd. v. Speck, 184 Tenn. 616, 201 S.W.2d 991 (1947).
46. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 1535 (Williams 1934); McCord v. Southern Ry.,
187 Tenn. 247, 213 S.W.2d 184 (1948); Browning v. Alabama Great Southern
R.R., 259 S.W.2d 154 (1953); and see TENN. CODE ANN. § 6901.30 (Williams
Supp. 1952); Clinton v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889 (1947).
47. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad and Public Utilities Comm'n,
261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).

48. See Lacey, supra note 37; cf. Boone, supra note 6.
49. 263 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1953).
50. Id. at 510. Cf. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 748-50 (1951), as to general
availability of injunctions and declaratory judgments as a means of reviewing
administrative action in state courts.
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Scope of judicial review raises troublesome questions as to the
extent to which reviewing courts will substitute their judgment for
that of the agency with regard to the facts or the law in a particular
case. The normal pattern in Administrative Law makes use of the
"substantial evidence" test in judicial review of administrative findings
of fact.5 ' Under this test the reviewing court will not itself determine
the facts or weigh the evidence before the agency but ascertain
whether or not the record before the agency contains substantial or
material evidence to support its findings of fact. This is the test
usually applied in Tennessee by reason of the provisions of the particular statute or because it is the required approach when reviewing
under the common law writ of certiorari. 52 During the survey period
this test was expressly applied in the following decisions: Roberts v.
Knoxville Transit Lines, 53 State ex rel. Caylor v. Miller,54 and Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. Railroad and Public Utilities Commission.5 5 The
case of Browning v. Alabama Great Southern Ry. 56 seems to permit
fact determinations of an assessing authority to be "final" in a more
or less absolute sense. However, this instance instead of being a case
of true non-reviewable administrative action, is simply one where
the area of discretion accorded the agency is more extensive. It is
still reviewable to see if those limits have been exceeded under the
power of the court to determine if the State Board of Equalization
has acted "illegally, fraudulently or in excess of jurisdiction."
The Hoover case is illustrative of the difference between the operation of a "substantial evidence" rule for judicial review of administrative fact findings and one that involves judicial weighing of evidence
or more extensively redetermining the facts. The Tennessee Supreme
Court has resisted suggestions that the statutes should be construed
to require the reviewing court to determine independently the facts
underlying all types of exercise of administrative authority. The
literal language of § 9014, even prior to its 1951 amendment, might
reasonably suggest the contrary.57 In Anderson v. Memphis the court
said:
51. DAVIs, ADMNISTRATIn LAW c. 20, especially pp. 914-17 (1951); see
Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. or PA. L. REV.
1026 (1941).
52. Tennessee Cartage Co. v. Pharr, 184 Tenn. 414, 199 S.W.2d 1119 (1947).
53. 259 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
54. 263 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1953).
55. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
56. 195 Tenn. 252, 259 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. 1953).
57. "... . The hearing [in the reviewing court] shall be on the proof introduced before the board or commission ... and upon such other evidence as
either party may desire to introduce .

. .

. The chancellor shall reduce his

findings of fact... to writing and make them parts of the record." TiN'N. CODE
ANN. § 9014 (Williams 1934).
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"There is, however, no support for the contention that this language
of the statutes has the effect of overthrowing the established practice by
subjecting the merits of every action of statutory commissions and boards
to judicial review, substituting the discretion of the .... courts for that

of administrative bodies. To so construe the statute would be to broadly
extend the judicial power into a field heretofore considered the proper
domain of the executive or administrative. .

.

. Such an extension of

judicial power is one which the courts have been and are properly loath
to assume, and miy not be accomplished by judicial construction of even
a doubtful statute."58
In 1951 § 9014 had added to it the following sentence:
"In making such findings of fact the Chancellor shall weigh the evidence
and determine the facts by the preponderance of the proof." 59
The decision in the Hoover case construing the effect of this amendment and rendering it largely ineffective in terms of changing the
pre-existing law is, of course, of momentous importance in the Administrative Law of this jurisdiction.
The Hoover case arose out of the petition of one Robinson before
the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission to secure certificates of
convenience and necessity for eight freight haulage routes. Certain
other truck carriers (referred to as the "Hoover Group") opposed the
petition and filed certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County
after the commission, subsequent to full hearing, acted favorably
upon it. The chancellor did not apply the 1951 amendment to § 9014
since it became effective after the hearing before the commission.
Proceeding as usual under the common law writ of certiorari he

found substantial evidence to support the granting of operating rights
over three of the eight routes but no evidence to support the other
five. Appeal was perfected only from the affirmance of the three
certificates and the Court of Appeals held that the 1951 amendment
should have guided the chancellor in his disposition. It agreed that
the three certificates were supported by "material substantial evidence" but that the evidence preponderated against the commission's
finding. Accordingly, it cancelled in its entirety the commission's
order. The Supreme Court, first refused to hear, then granted certiorari
after finding a constitutional question involved. A divided court, with
Justice Gailor writing the opinion, reversed the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and affirmed the decree of the chancellor. Justice Tomlinson wrote a dissenting opinion.
The construction given the 1951 Amendment by the court of appeals
58. 167 Tenn. 648, 652-53, 72 S.W.2d 1059 (1934).
59. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 261, § 1. General reference should be had to
Lacey, supra note 37, for additional discussion of the question raised by this
amendment.
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was unconstitutional under the separation of powers provision, 60 the
Supreme Court majority opinion declares. If the statute is construed
so as to require the reviewing court to weigh the evidence-in Order
to perform a legislative or administrative function, such as deciding
upon the issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity, it would
be imposing a non-judicial function upon the court, which the Constitution forbids. Justice Gailor's opinion relies heavily upon the opinion in In re.CumberlandPower Co.6 and points out further that, under
the common law writ of certiorari applicable in this instance, only
questions of law will be reviewed by the courts. "An order of the
Commission which is not supported by any evidence is arbitrary and
void, and therefore within judicial power to quash under the common
law writ of certiorari .... The question whether there is any material
evidence to support the finding and order of the Commission is, therefore, a matter of law for the Court upon review, and to ascertain that,
whether there is any material evidence, is the limited purpose for
which the evidence introduced before the Commission is admissable in
the Court granting the common law writ of certiorari. ' '6 a To avoid
the unconstitutional construction given the 1951 amendment to § 9014
by the Court of Appeals, the following is'stated as the proper construction:
"The effect of the amendatory Act was, therefore, only to require
the Chancellor to review the evidence which had been introduced before
the Commission, and to determine by a preponderance of the evidence,
whether the Commission had acted beyond its jurisdiction, arbitrarily,
fraudulently or illegally. Since this was the long established limit of
appropriate judicial review under the common law writ, the amendatory
Act of 1951 could have no further or greater effect on procedure under
the common law writ, whatever may be the effect of the amendment on
a proceeding under the statutory writ, Code sec. 8990."62

Justice Tomlinson's dissent deals with this last suggested construction in this manner:
...
according to the majority opinion, the 1951 Act requires the Court,
in reviewing a fact conclusion of the Public Utilities Commission, to
determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether such fact con-

60. TENN. CONST. Art. II, §§ 1-2.
61. 147 Tenn. 504, 249 S.W. 818 (1923). This case had held unconstitutional
Chapter 107 of the 1921 Public Acts of Tennessee, by which the legislature had
attempted to give a right of appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of
the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission. For a similar holding under

the Federal Constitution see Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S.

428, 43 Sup. Ct. 445, 67 L. Ed. 731 (1923). Compare Federal Radio Commn v.

General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 50 Sup. Ct. 389, 74 L. Ed. 969 (1930) with
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266,
276, 53 Sup. Ct. 627, 77 L. Ed. 1166 (1933).

61a. 261 S.W.2d 233, 238-239.
62. Id. at 238,

.
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clusion is supported by any substantial evidence. Such a construction, as
I see it, of the 1951 Act is to reduce it to an absurdity in that it proposes
to require the Court to do that which is impossible." 03

This dissenting opinion goes on to state that the proper meaning of
the 1951 change is to require the reviewing court to determine whether
the fact conclusion of an administrative board to commission is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. "I think that is what the
Legislature intended." Justice Tomlinson sees nothing "non-judicial"
in determining matters on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence and he feels that the constitution permits the legislature to
enlarge as well as diminish the sphere of action of the courts.
There would seem to be little doubt that Justice Tomlinson is correct as to the intent of those responsible for the language in the 1951
amendment to § 9014. He is undoubtedly correct also in pointing out
the substantially meaningless result as applied to the review of evidence that the construction the majority opinion gives the amendment to avoid what is considered an unconstitutional interpretation.
On the other hand, the majority decision is thoroughly consistent in
its general approach with the language of Anderson v. Memphis14
quoted above as well as the factors underlying the result in In re
Cumberland Power Co.65 There is a recognition in it of the basic
unworkability of a system of judicial review where the courts independently determine the facts underlying the exercise 'of a judgment
or discretion that is best left to the legislature or the executive (and
therefore "non-judicial"). As a matter of sound governmental organization it does not make much sense to establish and spend large
sums for agencies to exercise specialized knowledge and judgment in
finding certain facts and then let that judgment be subject to a completely de novo determination on the same or additional evidence in
a reviewing court. If the particular agency does not justify such
confidence it is doubtful if its continued existence is desirable.
The Hoover decision leaves many questions unanswered, particularly as- to the categories of administrative action where a "judicial"
as opposed, to a "non-judicial" function is being exercised, permitting
a complete re-examination of the facts by the reviewing court.0 0 By
63. Id. at 239-40.

64. 167 Tenn. 648, 72 S.W.2d 1059 (1934).
65. 147 Tenn. 504, 249 S.W. 818 (1923).

66. If the administrative determination of fact being reviewed can be phrased
as involving a question of law or as involving the facts underlying an asserted
constitutional right then there is no reason to expect that the courts will feel
precluded from independently determining such facts. They can be expected
to regard such a determination as "judicial," even though rate-making, for
example, is widely regarded as a "legislative" function. See DAvis, ADmInrsTRATV LAW 918-22 (1951). The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated if a state withholds from
its courts the opportunity of passing independently upon the facts in deciding
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placing its decision, in effect, upon a constitutional basis, the supreme
court has made it impossible for the legislature to impose upon the
courts the exercise of a discretion that they frequently are ill-equipped
to perform and which in our scheme of government is normally looked
upon as "non-judicial." In taking this position, the court puts Tennessee in line with the weight of authority prevailing throughout the
67
country in judicial review of legislative-type fact determinations.
the constitutionality of public utility rates set by a commission. Ohio Water

Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed.
908 (1920).

And see St. Joseph's Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.

38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936). While there is considerable question as to continued validity of these decisions in terms of federal Constitu-

tional law, the doctrine has been applied recently under state constitutions in
New York and Massachusetts. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296
N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947); Lowell Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811 (1949); and see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
There is also the matter of the court feeling equally competent to exercise
the particular judgment indulged in by the agency and, acting accordingly,
particularly where not hindered by statutory provisions giving "finality" to
the administrative fact determination. See Staples v. Brown, 113 Tenn. 639,
85 S.W. 254 (1905); Tomlinson v. Board of Equalization, 88 Tenn. 1, 12 S.W.
414 (1889); Binford v. Carline, 9 Tenn. App. 364 (W.S. 1928). DAVIs, AnminsTRATnI
LAw 893-97 (1951); and Lacey, supra note 37 at 363.
67. See DAVIs, ADmInISTRATE LAw 893-95 (1951); Note, De Novo Judicial
Review of State Administrative Findings, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1217-26 (1952); cf.

Davis, JudicialReview of Administrative Findings in West Virginia-A Study
in Separation of Powers, 44 W. VA. L. Q. 270-376 (1938); and Wade, Recent
Mississippi Oil and Gas Cases, 18 Miss. L. 3. 243, 261-66 (1947).
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APPENDIX*
(The assistance of Harold Seligman, Assistant General Counsel of the
Tennessee Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, in the selection and
preparation of the material in this Appendix is gratefully acknowledged.)
The Tennessee and Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction (apart from
tax assessment functions) includes the granting of certificates of convenience
and necessity and contract haulers' permits to motor carriers; the regulation
of schedules, rates, discontinuance and abandonment of railroads; and control
of service areas, corporate financing, sale or merger, and rates of utilities,
which include gas, telephone, water and various other types of public utilities.
The Commission sits as a quasi-judicial body, composed of three commissioners who hear cases under the rules of evidence and procedure of chancery
proceedings. During the course of the year ending June 30, 1954, the Commissfon had formal hearings in more than 200 cases and issued more than 1500
orders in matters presented to it. This appendix will summarize a few cases
selected to illustrate the differing types of questions coming before the commission.
The case of Central Bus Lines, Inc. (Approval of Schedule 5-A) originated
with the filing of a schedule between Nashville and Knoxville by Central
Trailways, now Continental Trailways. A question arose as to the authority
of Central to serve this route, The certificates of convenience and necessity
held by Central Bus Lines were limited to four round trips daily between
Nashville and Knoxville. Certificate No. 9-F, held by Central between Sparta
and'Crossville, was attempted to be used under Code § 5501.5a by tacking as
authority for this schedule. The Commission by its order disallowed the use
of Certificate No. 9-F, stating that said certificate had been abandoned because
of non-use during the previous five year period. The Commission stated that
Code Section 5501.10 of Williams Code of Tennessee set forth the provisions
for the abandonment or discontinuance of service, and that it was incumbent
upon the carrier to serve all certificates unless otherwise suspended by order
of the Commission. Central Bus Lines was allowed a rehearing and argued
that Section 5501.10 made it mandatory upon the Commission to have a hearing and written order before the Commission could revoke a certificate. The
Comnmission upheld its original order in the rehearing and the case has been
appealed to the chancery court.
An example of an application for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity is that of J. W. Smith, doing business as Smith Freight Lines of
Chattanooga, Tennessee, in Docket No. MC 3622. Application was made for
service between Jamestown, Livingston, Cookeville and Sparta, Tennessee.
Testimony was presented to the Commission at an open hearing at which
carriers presently holding authority over the same route appeared in protest.
The applicant in this case did not make a sufficient showing to the Commission
for the necessity of additional service to be rendered over these highways, and
further the effect of the proposed transportation service on existing carriers
was regarded to be highly detrimental. Proof on behalf of the carrier serving
the Jamestown to Sparta area was sufficient to convince the Commission that
the application should be denied.
Under its rule-making power the Commission, undertaking to extend and
make definite the commercial zones and terminal areas for Tennessee motor
carriers serving in intrastate traffic, issued the proposed order in Special
MC 177, suggesting the extended service areas. The purpose of this general
order was to make specific the areas which a carrier may serve beyond the
*
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actual existing city limit of all cities and unincorporated towns. A carrier
having authority to serve Memphis, Murfreesboro or Tyner, Tennessee, presently does not know how far beyond the existing city limit or incorporated
area it may lawfully serve. Most cities have various reasons for failing to
extend corporate limits at an equal pace to both the industrial and residential
growth of cities and towns in Tennessee. The Commission is endeavoring by
a general order to make a specific area within which certified carriers may
serve, under its Docket No. MC-177.
Exemplary of cases in the Railroad Division, the Railway Express Agency,
Inc., filed tariffs with the Commission requesting a 15% general increase on
intrastate traffic and a 20% increase on certain classifications of commodities.
After hearing, before a hearing examiner appointed by the Commission, it was
recommended that the proposed increase be totally denied. The basis for this
recommendation was the fact that Railway Express Agency shipments have
continued to decrease during recent years, following rate increases allowed
by the Commission, and it was the belief of the examiner that an additional
increase would cause further diversion of traffic, which would result in a
decrease of revenue. Exceptions were filed to the Examiner's Report, but the
Commission ratified the report and issued its order, following the Examiner's
recommendation. Railway Express Agency, Inc., then instituted a proceeding
before the Interstate Commerce Commission where the matter is now pending,
seeking to have the Federal Commission establish in Tennessee non-discriminatory intrastate rates and charges.
Commission Docket No. R-3448 was an application of the Clinchfield Railroad for the discontinuance of passenger service in Tennessee under Code Section 5398.1. This Section of the Code is the only mandatory section imposed by
the legislature upon the Commission and provides that in passenger operations
by a railroad, if the direct operating expenses exceed the aggregate gross
revenue by more than 30% for a twelve months' period, the railroad shall be
allowed to discontinue its operation. In the case of the Clinchfield Railroad,
the direct operating expenses exceeded the aggregate gross revenue by more
than 60%, leaving the Commission no alternative but to grant the discontinuance. Discontinuance under this provision is dependent upon the
definition of direct operating costs, which the Commission defined in its
Docket No. R-3308 involving the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The
Louisville and Nashville Railroad discontinuance case was appealed to the
Supreme Court, which upheld the Commission's decision of direct operating
costs in the case of Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Fowler, to be reported in
volume 196 of the Tennessee Reports.
The Commission has jurisdiction of some eighty independent telephone
companies in Tennessee, and of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph
Company, the largest company in Tennessee. In Docket No. U-3314, the Commission disallowed a rate increase designed to produce an additional revenue
to this company of five million dollars. During the course of the hearing, an
amendment was requested changing the test year which would have the effect
of advancing the company's request to seven million dollars. The Commission disallowed the entire request and the matter was subsequently appealed to chancery court, which court upheld the Commission's order.
In contrast to both the requests and the Commission's decision is the case
of the Mt. Juliet Telephone Company, Docket No. U-3417. The applicant in
this cause presented a case in which 285 of his 288 subscribers supported the
company's request for an increase, and the three persons not included as sup-
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porters were unable to be contacted at the time of the hearing. The Commission granted the request for increase from the bench, a rare occurrence.
In Docket No. U-3423, the Arkansas Power and Light Company requested
permission to serve electric power to certain islands on the Mississippi River,
considered a part of the State of Tennessee. The Commission had to undertake a determination of whether these islands were actually a part of the
State of Tennessee, and further whether or not the Tennessee Commission had
jurisdiction over this matter. The Commission accepted the jurisdiction and
granted the application.
As an illustration of the regulation of various corporate financing, the
Commission approved in Docket No. U-3556, the application of the Arkansas
Power and Light Company for authority to issue and sell $750,000,000
worth of first mortgage bonds. In recent years, numerous utilities, particularly
telephone and gas companies, have sought extremely heavy financing through
the Rural Electrification Administration, and private lenders (Stromberg
Carlson Credit Corporation, for example) in order to build inter-toll dial
systems and natural gas distributing systems throughout the state. Careful
consideration must be given by the Commission in these financial programs to
i sure that the present rate payer does not bear the burden of long range
financing.

